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Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs
TITO CORDELLA and GIOVANNI DELL'ARICCIA*
When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations,
conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction
programs. If donors cannot perfectly monitor all recipients' actions, however, condi-
tionality entails an inefficient allocation of resources. Under such conditions, the
optimal amount of conditionality varies (often not monotonically) with the recipi-
ents' degree of social commitment. Finally, if recipients' preferences are not observ-
able, conditionality can be used to prevent recipients with a weak commitment to
poverty reduction from obtaining aid funds. This may, however, lead to further
distortions in terms of resource allocation and to phenomena of "aid rationing."
T
he most indebted countries are among the worst performers in terms of human
development indicators.
1 Starting from this stylized fact, the donor community
(multilateral agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and bilateral
donors) seems to agree on two basic principles. First, some debt relief/aid is neces-
sary to reduce the human development divide between "North" and "South."
2
Second, since aid is fungible, and recipient country governments are sovereign,
*The authors are economists in the Research Department. They are grateful to Craig Burnside, Guido
De Blasio, Ana Paula Fialho Lopes, Paolo Mauro, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Timothy Lane, Alex
Mourmouras, Ashoka Mody, Alessandro Rebucci, Peter Wickham, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer for useful
comments and suggestions.
1 Berlage, and others (2000) report that 84 percent of the countries with a human development indi-
cator lower than 0.5 belong to the list of highly indebted poor countries (hereinafter referred to as HIPCs).
2 Of course, there is a large disagreement on how much debt relief is either necessary or desirable. For
an estimation of the real amount of debt relief implicit in the HIPC initiative, see Cohen (2000). For a
generous plan for completely extinguishing the outstanding debt of 49 poor countries by year 2015, see
Berlage, and others (2000).
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nothing ensures that the resources generated by an aid program will be devoted to
effective poverty reduction policies. If this is the case, a tension might arise
between the need to impose conditions limiting the risk of external assistance
being mishandled and the efficiency costs that conditionality may create in the
recipient economy. In fact, as long as the donors cannot perfectly observe (and
monitor) all actions undertaken by recipient country governments, the condition-
ality they can impose is necessarily incomplete and thus potentially distortionary.
Furthermore, in such a situation, a high level of conditionality may absorb an
excessive amount of resources, "crowding out" other investments necessary for the
success of the reform program. This paper provides a simple one-donor one-recip-
ient framework to study these problems.
In our model, the donor's only concern is the effective implementation of social
programs,
3 while the recipient government obtains utility both from the realization
of such programs and from other nonsocially oriented expenses.
4 In such a situa-
tion, the donor uses the leverage associated with aid (or debt relief) to impose,
through conditionality, its own preferences on how resources should be allocated.
5
In such a framework, we prove three results that shed some light on the
important policy issue of how to optimally design conditionality when the objec-
tives of the donor and those of the recipient are not perfectly aligned. First, condi-
tionality entails distortions and is responsible for an inefficient allocation of
resources. Second, aid policies should be tailored according to the recipient
government's preferences in terms of social spending—its social commitment—
and the optimal amount of conditionality varies (generally in a nonmonotonic
way) with the latter. Finally, if the characteristics of the recipient government are
not observable or, alternatively, if the aid contract cannot depend upon the type of
government, conditionality can be used to screen countries (governments). Then,
excessive and/or insufficient levels of conditionality, relative to the case where the
recipient's type is observable, may arise as equilibrium outcomes. This may also
lead to forms of aid rationing.
The intuition for such results is as follows: in our framework, only some of the
policy measures that contribute to the success of a social program are verifiable, and
thus can be subject to conditionality. Under such circumstances, if the donor forces
the recipient government to allocate substantial resources to certain verifiable compo-
nents of the program, such as investments in infrastructure, the latter will underinvest
in other less verifiable components, such as administrative and managerial outlays,
costly supportive policies, or other implementation expenses. Furthermore, as the
3 As common in the recent theoretical literature on aid (see Svensson (2000b), Azam and Laffont (2001),
and Federico (2001)), we assume that the motivations for aid (debt relief) are fully altruistic. Of course, this
is not necessarily (and often has not been) the case. Indeed, foreign aid has often been motivated by polit-
ical and strategic considerations, as Alesina and Dollar (2000) show. We abstract from this important issue,
as our interest is that of addressing the normative question of how conditionality should be designed when
the donor community's exclusive interest is that of fighting poverty in aid recipient countries.
4 For example, the recipient government could be subject to the influence of special interest groups
opposing socially oriented reforms (see Mayer and Mourmouras (2002)).
5 Using the taxonomy proposed by Collier (1997), our model is one of paternalistic conditionality.
However, the success of the poverty reduction program depends upon monitorable arid nonmonitorable
inputs, so that conditionality is necessarily imperfect.
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reaction of the recipient government to the imposition of conditionality depends upon
its social commitment, the donor needs to design conditionality according to the
recipient's type. From this, it follows that when conditionality is used as a screening
device, the donor may have (and generally has) to impose levels of conditionality that
would be suboptimal if the recipient's type were observable.
The idea that properly designed conditionality may enhance the effectiveness
of "socially friendly" aid programs is gaining increasing support. For instance,
whereas in the past NGOs often voiced a strong disagreement with the very prin-
ciple of conditionality in structural adjustment programs, they now recognize that
some form of conditionality is needed for any debt relief project to be conducive
to poverty reduction. According to CISDE-Caritas International (1999): "Because
not all governments can be counted on to use resources freed through debt relief
to invest in the poor and marginalized sectors of society, there is a case for making
a strong link between investment in human development and debt cancellation."
Oxfam International also points out possible incentive compatibility problems in
the debt relief and poverty reduction strategy, and stresses that the "the focus
should be on the development of incentives for converting debt relief into poverty
reduction investments."
6 In contrast, a large literature emphasizes the limits and
the potential costs of conditionality,
7 and nowadays there is substantial evidence
that "conditional" aid alone cannot buy a successful social program. Burnside and
Dollar (2000) show, indeed, that only in the presence of sound policies does aid
foster growth. Instead, in countries with a poor policy environment, large amounts
of aid can not only be ineffective but, by allowing governments to delay reforms,
they may even be detrimental to growth (World Bank, 1998).
The theoretical literature on the effectiveness of aid in the presence of strategic
interaction between donors and recipient governments is limited.
8 Notable excep-
tions are Svensson (2000a and b), Azam and Laffont (2001), and Federico (2001).
The first paper by Svensson develops a game theoretic rent-seeking model to
assess the effect of aid windfalls on the provision of public goods when social
groups compete over common-pool resources. Closely related to our paper is
Svensson (2000b), which studies the strategic interaction between a donor and two
recipients in a model in which the donor cares uniquely about the welfare of the
poor while the recipients also pursue other goals. Since, as in our model, the effec-
tiveness of poverty alleviation programs depends on a nonverifiable implementa-
tion effort on the recipient's part, the first-best aid contract is unenforceable. While
our setup shares some of the key features of Svensson (2000b), the focus of our
analysis is different. In fact, while our interest is in designing an ex ante full
commitment optimal aid contract that depends on the characteristics of recipient
governments, in Svensson recipients are ex ante identical and the main problem
the donor faces is one of commitment. There, it is the very anticipation that aid
flows will (ex post) be disbursed according to the need of the poor that negatively
affects the recipient government's incentives to carry out effective social
6See UNICEF/Oxfam International (1999).
7See, for example, Sachs (1989), Berg (1997), Collier, and others (1997), and Killick (1997).
8See Drazen (2000).
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programs. Along similar lines, Federico (2001) studies the optimal level of condi-
tionality in a model in which donor's commitment is limited. The focus on ex ante
full-commitment contracts links our paper to Azam and Laffont (2001). They also
study the characteristics of incentive-compatible aid contracts when the preference
of the donor and those of the recipient are not aligned. The main difference
between our model and theirs is that we do not assume complete contracts (perfect
monitoring) and thus we allow conditionality to be distortionary. This has impor-
tant implications on the way in which conditionality should be used as a screening
device. Marchesi and Thomas (1999) also explore the idea of screening by (costly)
conditionality in the context of IMF programs aimed at maximizing the expected
repayment of the debt. In this paper, we borrow that idea and apply it to the case
where the principal's objective is the maximization of the social impact of aid
rather than the repayment of the debt.
THE MODEL
In our model, the international community is represented by a single donor who is
willing to grant an aid/debt relief program that provides fresh resources that a
developing country government (the recipient, from now on) might devote to
poverty reduction programs. Formally, we denote by G the recipient tax revenue
(net of the debt service), and by A, the amount of aid/debt relief, which we assume
to be fixed.
9
The recipient (denoted by subscript R) devotes its budgetary resources to
developmental and nondevelopmental consumption. In particular, we assume that
it maximizes the following CES objective function:
1
UR = (asP + (1-a)mP)p, (1)
where s denotes the consumption of a social good (e.g., social programs, such as
poverty alleviation, primary education, access to safe water, etc.); m denotes
nondevelopmental consumption (e.g., military expenses); a e (0, 1) defines the
recipient's "social preferences;"
1
0 and p belongs to the interval (0, 1). We further
assume that the social good is produced out of two inputs (k, e) one of which is
observable and verifiable by the donor (k), and the other is not (e). We can think
of the first as capital (e.g., material needed to build a school or a hospital) and of
the second as nonmonitorable effort (administrative and managerial outlays, or
other costly supportive policies needed for a school or hospital to work).
Alternatively, we could have assumed that some of the activities needed for the
9In addition to greatly simplifying the analysis, this assumption is quite realistic for the debt relief
program under the HIPC initiative. In such a case, the amount of debt relief is a function of the existing
stock of external debt, and thus, at least in principle, not the outcome of negotiations between donors and
recipient governments.
10The assumption that there is substantial heterogeneity in how HIPCs allocate public resources
between military and social expenditures is a very reasonable one. According to World Bank data for
1997, the ratio of health to military expenditure varied from the 0.13 of Vietnam to the 4.3 of Guyana (data
are available for 29 HIPCs).
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success of a poverty reduction program were inherently multitasking, so that the
donor could only exercise control over a part of the recipient's budget. What is
indeed critical for our analysis is that both the monitorable and nonmonitorable
input are essential for the production of the social good or, less loosely, that the
technology for the production of the social good is convex.
Then, for the sake of simplicity, and without great loss of generality, we
assume that the social good is produced according to the following technology
s = ke, which is symmetric in the two inputs. We further assume that the recipient
government has no access to the international capital market,
1
1 and thus that it has
to run a balanced budget, both in the case in which aid/debt relief is granted and
in the case in which it is not, that is,
+ 5A, with (2)
l, if aid is granted;
0, otherwise. _ J
As we already mentioned, in our setup the donor is fully altruistic, and only cares
about the success of social programs. If this is the case, its objective function may
be written as:
W = f(ke), (3)
with f'(.) > 0. In Section II, we briefly consider the case of aid programs that are
costly for the donor country.
No Conditionality Benchmark
In what follows, we first characterize the effect of aid in the absence of any form
of conditionality. Then, we briefly discuss the characteristics of the aid contract in
the case where all components of the social programs are observable and
contractible upon, to then analyze the more interesting (and realistic case) in
which the donor is unable to contract upon some of the actions of the recipient.
Finally, we discuss situations in which the donor cannot either observe the recip-
ient's social commitment or write aid contracts that are contingent on a.
As a useful benchmark, we first consider the case in which the donor imposes
no restrictions on the recipient's budget allocation. In the absence of condition-
ality, the government will allocate resources to maximize its objective function (1)
subject to the budget constraint (2). After substituting (2) into (1), the problem of
the recipient can be written as:
1
max U = max(a(ke)
p + (1 - a)(G + 5A- k - e)
P)
P. (4)
k,e k,e V /
Since the technology for the production of the social good is convex and
symmetric in the two inputs, in equilibrium the recipient government allocates an
1
1 For many aid recipients (such as the HIPCs) such an assumption is hardly a controversial one.
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equal amount of resources to the capital and managerial components of social
expenditure. The solution of problem (4) is thus given by k* = e* = x*; where x*
belongs to the interval [0, ^pi). In order for the expenditure in the social good to
be strictly positive, we need a and/or G + dA to be sufficiently large (when asso-
ciated with a high substitutability between social and military expenditure).
1
2 This
in turn implies that poor human development indicators are the result of either a
lack of resources, or a lack of social commitment on the part of the recipient
government, or, and perhaps more realistically, of both. The upper bound ^±^
follows from the fact that the most socially committed recipients (a ~ 1) will
devote their whole budget to the production of the social good, and thus about half
of their resources, x* « ^±^, to each of the two inputs.
If 8 = 0, the solution of equation (4) gives the values k
NA and e
NA that the
recipient country government would choose in absence of aid, the superscript NA












Instead, when 8 = 1, the solution of problem (4) yields the budget allocation
chosen by the recipient when aid is granted but no conditionality is imposed,
which we denote k
NC and e
NC (the superscript NC standing for no conditionality).
Finally, as long as under unconditional aid the social good is produced in posi-
tive amounts, its production level increases monotonically with the amount of aid
granted by the donor (as well as with the level of social commitment of the recip-
ient). Aid is thus likely to increase the amount of resources that the recipient is
willing to devote to social spending. For any a < 1, however, the objectives of the
recipient and those of the donor are not perfectly aligned, and the latter should be
able to obtain a larger production of the social good by imposing conditionality
when granting aid.
Optimal Conditionality When "Types" are Observable
Should the donor have full control over all the components of social spending in the
recipient country or, alternatively, should it be able to contract on both capital and
managerial expenditures, then the first best would be implementable. The optimal
contract would be one that maximizes the donor's utility (3) subject to the indi-
vidual rationality (IR) constraint of the recipient, defined below. In other words, the
equilibrium level of k and e would yield the highest level of production of the social
good for which the recipient is at least as well off as in absence of aid.
In what follows, we consider the more reasonable and interesting case in which
the donor can only observe and make aid conditional upon the capital component
of social programs, k, and thus the recipient is free to choose any nonnegative
12More precisely, p < 1/2 => x* > 0. If p = 1/2, G + bA >{^J <^> x* > 0. Finally, when p > 1/2 a sufficient
condition (albeit quite strong) for x* > 0 is that G + dA> 4(^)
p.
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amount for the other component, e. This captures the idea that the relation between
the donor community and a recipient government is a complex one in which both
actors act strategically. Recipients react to conditionality by reallocating the budget
expenditure in order to maximize their objective function. This in turn implies that
the donor will have to take into account the response of the recipient when setting
conditionality on k. Formally, for any fixed level of k > k
NC imposed by the donor,
the recipient will maximize (4) with respect to e. The first order necessary and suffi-
cient condition for a maximum can be written as:
ocfcPeP-
1 - (1 - a)(G + A-k- ef~
{ = 0,
(6)
from which it follows that the optimal unobserved component of social spending,
£(&), is given by:
(7) e(k) =
(1 -OC)P-I (G + A-k)
I I •
(I-OC)P-I +£(a&)p-i
We can now write the problem of the donor as:




p + (1 - a)(G + A-k- e(k)ff > U
m{a),
where the last expression is the IR constraint of the recipient. We denote by k
IR the
value of k for which the IR is exactly binding, that is,
k
IR = k:(a(ke(k))
p + (1 - cc)(G + A - k - e(k))
pY = U
NA(a)I (
To characterize the solution of problem (8), we first prove the following proposi-
tion that sheds some light on the costs and the advantages associated with the
imposition of conditionality in aid programs.
Proposition 1
I. Any binding level of conditionality (k > k
NC) induces a distortion in the produc-
tion of the social good (e(k) < k).
II. By imposing conditionality, however, the donor can always improve on the
production of the social good (3k e(k
NC, k




Proposition 1 shows that even if some components of the budget cannot be
contracted upon, the donor can strictly improve the effectiveness of aid by
imposing conditionality on the contractible component of social spending. Since
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for any k > k
NC, e(k) < k, however, the recipient reacts to conditionality on the
monitorable input by reducing expenditures (with respect to the efficient level) on
the other input. This is clearly inefficient, as both the donor and the recipient
would be better off if it were possible to reallocate some of the resources from the
capital to the managerial component of social spending. The fact that this is not
possible is one main feature of our model, and depends upon the characterization
of the donor/recipient interaction as a noncooperative game. In such a game, the
recipient exploits the donor's inability to observe some of the inputs necessary for
the production of the social good to reallocate resources according to its own pref-
erences. In our setup, the donor (acting as a Stackelberg leader) anticipates the
reaction of the recipient when choosing the "right" amount of conditionality to
attach to an aid program. Notwithstanding the fact that in our model conditionality
is costly, the second part of Proposition 1 provides a strong justification for the use
of conditionality in poverty reduction programs financed by the donor community.
In fact, for any level of social commitment of the recipient, we prove the existence
of a level of conditionality that is acceptable for the recipient (i.e., compatible with
its IR constraint), and at the same time, that it increases the level of production of
the social good.
With this in mind, we are now able to characterize the optimal amount of
conditionality that the donor would impose upon a recipient government of type a
in order to maximize the production of the social good. Formally, the optimal
amount of conditionality k




k = argmax f(ke(k)},
k
k can be interpreted as the level of conditionality that the donor would choose if it
were to disregard the recipient's IR constraint, and thus it is the optimal amount of
conditionality when the IR constraint is slack. Of course, when the recipient's IR
constraint is binding, the maximum amount of conditionality that the donor is able
to impose is given by k
IR. In order to solve for the optimal level of conditionality,
we first need to better characterize the properties of k
IR and k as functions of the
recipient's social commitment. We do this in the following lemma:
Lemma 1
T 111? ' 1 • ' ' /•///? A T 1 IR G + A + JA(2G + A)
I. k
1K is strictly increasing in a, Urn k
1K = A, limk
lK = — —*- ;
a—>0 a—>1 2
II. k is strictly decreasing in a, Um k = ^^, Umk = ^^-. Proof: See Appendix I.
a->0 ^~P a->l
 2-
According to Lemma 1, on the one hand, more socially committed govern-
ments are willing to accept higher levels of conditionality: k
IR is increasing in a.
On the other hand, because of the convexity in the production of the social good,
the donor will want to abstain from imposing excessive conditionality on govern-
ments that would, by themselves, choose a high level of social spending. This in
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Note: Numbers in parentheses (above) are in percent.
following question: "And now, please, imagine a nine-step ladder where on the
bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the ninth,
stand the rich. On which step are you today?" Less than 0.5 percent of the people
in the sample replied that they were on step 8 or step 9. Other individual variables,
such as retirement pension, labor force participation, employment status, industry
of employment, enterprise ownership, region dummies, as well as the macroeco-
nomic and structural characteristics of the 38 regions represented in our sample,
are used in some empirical specifications.
1
0
IV. Empirical Specification and Econometric Issues
This paper employs a simple empirical model to analyze the determinants of indi-
vidual preferences towards reform. Let C* represent the difference between the
costs and benefits of transforming Russia from a socialist society with a centrally
planned economy to a democracy with a market economy for individual i, condi-
tional on economic and ideological factors. In particular, assume that C* is a linear
function of observed and unobserved socioeconomic, sociological, and regional
variables such that:
C* = XiB1 + e1i, (1)
where Xi is a vector of observed determinants and E1 represents unobserved varia-
tion. The error term is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and
variance o\. The choice to support returning to socialism, StopCoursei, for indi-
vidual i is then assumed to be given by:
11 (return to socialism) if C* > 0
StopCourse. = < . (2)
0 (don't return to socialism) if C* < 0
10A summary table, illustrating the representative nature of the sample, is available upon request.
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turns implies that k is strictly decreasing
1
3 with the level of social commitment
of the recipient. These two features of the solution imply that the optimum amount
of conditionality that the donor imposes on the recipient is generally not mono-
tonic in the social commitment of the government. Formally, we can prove the
following proposition that fully characterizes the optimal level of conditionality.
Proposition 2
If the amount of aid granted by the donor is not too large relative to the country's
own resources (A < -^), it exists a a
c e (0,1) such that the optimum level of condi-
tionality increases monotonically with a if a < a
c, and decreases monotonically
with a otherwise. If instead, A > -^, the optimal amount of conditionality
decreases monotonically with a. Proof: see Appendix I.
The intuition for this proposition is: when the amount of aid is not large (with
respect to the recipient's own resources), it is likely to be the case that for a socially
uncommitted government, the IR constraint is binding at the "optimum" level of
conditionality (k
IR < k). In other words, the amount of conditionality that would
maximize the production of the social good (on the recipient's reaction function) is
such that the recipients would be better off by not obtaining aid than by accepting
it with such a level of conditionality attached. In that case, the best the donor can do
is to impose a level of conditionality that keeps the recipient on its IR constraint.
Consequently, if this is the case, conditionality (on the monitorable component of
social program) is increasing in the recipient's social commitment (see the lemma
above). For governments with a relatively high interest in social spending, however,
the IR constraint becomes not binding. This is the case when a > a
c, with a
c
denoting the level of social commitment for which the IR of the recipients is exactly
binding at k = k (and thus slack for any a > a
c). When this is this case, if the donor
imposed the maximum level of conditionality acceptable for the recipient, it would
force the latter to use an extremely inefficient technique to produce the social good.
Such conditionality would just crowd out expenditure on the not monitorable input
needed for the production of the social good. Instead, by imposing the "optimum"
level of conditionality, the donor makes the recipient strictly better off than under
no aid. Furthermore, as a increases, the amount of resources that the government
would have devoted to social spending (even in the absence of conditionality) also
increases, so that the optimal level of conditionality decreases with the social
commitment of the recipient. In the limit, when a tends to 1, conditionality is totally
ineffective, and any binding level is detrimental to the poverty reduction program.
Finally, when the amount of aid is large enough, the level of conditionality for
which the recipient is indifferent between accepting conditional aid or not, k
IR,
would be so high, that the donor is indeed able to impose the "optimum" level of
conditionality, k, independently of the level of social commitment of the recipient.
Of course, in this case conditionality monotonically decreases with the social
commitment of the recipient for any values of a.
1
3 Notice, however, that when p —> 0, and thus when the utility function tends to a Cobb-Douglas, ^ —> 0.
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II. CONDITIONALITY WHEN a IS NOT OBSERVABLE
The analysis in the previous section showed that the optimal level of conditionality
on social spending depends upon the characteristics of the recipient government.
Furthermore, when conditionality can be imposed only on some components of
the budget, the relationship between the social commitment of the recipient
government, a, and the optimal level of "conditional" social spending is not
necessarily monotonic (Proposition 2). In this section, we explore the implications
of those results when the "type" of the recipient government is not observable or
when the aid contract cannot depend upon the type of the government.
The situation we have in mind is one where, because of political or regime
changes (like the end of a war), the recipient government's track record is either not
available or cannot be used to infer its preferences with regard to social expenditure.
In that context, we show that the donor's inability to impose type-specific condition-
ality leads to inefficiencies and, under certain conditions, to a form of aid rationing.
Alternatively, we can assume that for political constraints (related to certain hori-
zontal equity considerations), the donor community cannot grant aid to a country A
and deny it to a country B, if both countries are willing to agree on the same level of
conditionality. This may very well be the case for multilateral organizations that are
committed (often by statute) to the uniformity of treatment of their members.
The donor's inability to impose type-dependent conditionality entails, as
expected, an inefficiency that reduces the utility that it can derive from aid relative
to the case in which a is contractible upon. In what follows, we focus on two
particular aspects of that problem: first, we discuss situations in which excessive
or insufficient conditionality arise as equilibrium outcomes; second, we investi-
gate the possibility that informational asymmetries between donors and recipients
lead to a particularly bad outcome in which debt relief is denied to countries that
would obtain it if they were able to credibly signal their type to the donor.
Conditionality As a Screening Device
Assume that the donor is willing to grant aid only to governments that have a suffi-
cient social commitment. More precisely, assume that there is an a e (0, 1) such that
if the type of the government were observable, all governments with a > a would be
granted aid and all governments with a < a would be denied it.
In a context where a is not observable, conditionality can be used to screen
out recipients with a low degree of social commitment. Indeed, as the individual
rationality constraint of the recipient is increasing in a, a sufficiently high level of
k will have the effect of screening out government with a weak social commit-
ment. Such screening comes at a cost, however, namely excessive or insufficient
conditionality. We can distinguish two cases.
In the first case, see Figure la, the cut-off government below which no aid




and where ^ < 0. In such a case, in order to have all and only the governments
14Notice that this is always the case when A > pr.
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with a > a accept relief, the donor will have to impose k = k
IR(a), where k
IR(a)
is the k such that the IR is exactly binding for a government of type a. In so doing,
however, the donor will impose excessive conditionality on all governments with
a > a.
In the second case, see Figure 1b, the cut-off government below which no aid
would be granted lies in a region where the IR constraint is binding (a
c > a), and
where ^ > 0. In that case, the donor will impose too little conditionality to at least
all recipients in the interval (a, a
c]. Also, it is possible that for some d, k
c(a)=k
IR(a),
so that all governments in the region (a, 1) will be imposed too much conditionality.
In conclusion, we can make the following remark: the use of conditionality as
screening device may entail distortions as too little or too much conditionality may
be imposed on recipient countries.
This in turn may lead to forms of aid rationing. Indeed, it is possible that coun-
tries worth being granted aid when a is contractible upon (meaning with condition-
ality based upon their true type) are not worth being granted aid if conditionality
cannot be tailored to their type. This case is examined next.
Aid Rationing
The discussion in the previous section highlights a simple problem: the donor may
have to impose an excessive amount of conditionality in order to screen out socially
unfriendly governments (see Figure 1). This directly translates into a loss of donor's
utility relative to the case where the type of the government is observable.
Assume now that donors are willing to grant aid only under the expectation
that the resulting production of the social good would be above a certain threshold
C. This assumption is consistent with the idea that voters in donor countries would
consider unsuccessful any aid policy that did not achieve some minimum objec-
tive in terms of social good production, irrespective of the initial conditions in the
recipient country.
If the recipient's type is observable, this maps directly into a donor's policy
granting relief only to some government types, namely the more socially
committed ones.
1
5 Now let a be the degree of social commitment for which the
expected level of social good production is just acceptable from the donor's
perspective. Then, if a were observable, only governments with a > a would
obtain aid funds. More formally, we can define a, as the lower value of a, for
which k(a)e(k(a)) = C.
We now show that, in the presence of asymmetric information, the use of
conditionality as a screening device not only yields excessive (or insufficient)
conditionality, but it can also lead to aid rationing. With rationing, we define a situ-
ation in which governments that would receive aid/debt relief if they could cred-
ibly signal their type to the donor are denied it because of asymmetric information
problems. Formally, we can state the following proposition.
1
5 Throughout the analysis we will assume that the donor's objective is to grant relief to the largest number
































































































































so that there is a total "market failure" and no country receives aid.
Finally, it is worth noting that a donor's ability to use conditionality as a
screening device depends crucially on the form of their utility function. The
results in this section rely on the implicit assumption that donors rank recipient
governments by their type. That assumption is consistent with a situation where
the utility donors obtain from aid is increasing in a. However, that is not neces-
sarily the case when the donor's utility function is not linear in the production of
the social good. In that case, although the absolute increase in the production of
the social good associated with aid is always increasing in the recipient's type,
donors may want to focus instead on the relative increase. In other words, donors
may want to concentrate on recipients for which aid "makes a difference"; that is,
governments that in the absence of aid would allocate very few resources to
social spending.
In that context, it can be shown that if the donor's marginal utility decreases
"fast enough" with the production of the social good, the "preferred" recipients will
not be those with the highest degree of social commitment. Under those circum-
stances, the effectiveness of conditionality as a screening device is further dimin-





then all governments with a > & will accept the program and obtain aid. However,
it could also be that, for all a,
The intuition for this result is the following: if the donor screens out socially
uncommitted recipients, imposing a level of conditionality that corresponds to the
optimal level for recipient a (that is, when d < oc
c), by definition it will not ration
out that marginal government, and hence, given that the IR constraint is increasing
in a, it will not ration out any government that would have been granted aid under
type-contingent conditionality. On the contrary, if to screen out low a recipients, the
donor is forced to impose a level of conditionality that is above the optimal level for
the recipient at d (as is the case for d > oc
c), at least that marginal recipient will be
rationed out. Indeed, by definition, under type-contingent conditionality, the donor
is indifferent between granting and denying aid to a type d recipient. By imposing
a level of conditionality that is not optimal for type d recipients, however, the net
benefit from granting aid becomes negative. In other words, the donor will be forced
to impose an even higher level of conditionality, so that type d recipients will be
screened out also, and only recipients for whom the net benefit of granting relief is
positive are left in. More precisely, if there exists an d e (d,l) such that:
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Proposition 3
If a is not observable, there will be aid rationing if, and only if a > a
c. Proof:
see Appendix I.LIMITS OF CONDITIONALITY IN POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS
one cannot exclude high-type governments without also denying aid to recipients
with lower propensities to social spending.
III. CONCLUSION
It is well known that not all aid recipient governments have used, nor can they be
counted upon to use, developmental assistance to effectively improve the stan-
dards of living of the poorest sectors of their societies. This has led many in the
donor community to argue in favor of establishing a direct link between new aid
programs (such as debt cancellation) and investment in social programs.
1
6 In this
paper, we have provided a formal analysis of some of the pros and cons of such
conditionality.
We have showed that when the social preferences of donor and recipient coun-
tries differ, donors may use the leverage associated with aid programs (or debt
relief) to influence, through conditionality, the policies of the recipients. To the
extent that aid is fungible and not all the relevant actions of the recipient govern-
ment can be observed and contracted upon, however, conditionality needs to
balance the benefits of imposing a certain level of social spending, with the costs
arising from a distorted allocation of resources. In addition, consistent with the
recent empirical literature, we showed that the effectiveness of conditionality is
largely dependent on the recipient's commitment to the social program, so that
conditionality should be designed according to the social preferences of the latter.
Finally, in the more realistic context where donors cannot observe recipient's pref-
erences or cannot policy-discriminate across recipients, the paper shows that
conditionality may be effective in selecting the governments with the strongest
social commitment. However, such use of conditionality as screening device
entails costs associated with the imposition of suboptimal levels of conditionality
on recipient countries. This may lead to forms of aid rationing if governments that
would be granted aid if they could credibly signal their social commitment were
instead denied aid because of the donor's inability to discriminate between them
and less socially committed governments.
From a policy standpoint, by stressing the limits of conditionality, our model
suggests that recipient governments need to play a crucial and active role in the
successful implementation of a poverty reduction program. In that sense, our
results provide some analytical support to the argument that aid (or debt relief) can
only be successful in reducing poverty when there is "program ownership" on the
part of the recipient country.
1
7
Furthermore, our analysis of the asymmetric information case has some impli-
cations for the issue of cross-country aid distribution when political and informa-
tional constraints prevent donors from tailoring their policy to the structural
characteristics of recipient countries. In that context, our model suggests that
conditionality can act as an effective, although costly, screening device if donors
16See, for example, CISDE-Caritas (1999).
17In a companion paper, Cordelia and Dell'Ariccia (2001), we show that, because of the distortions
associated with incomplete conditionality, under certain conditions donors may obtain better results by
providing assistance in the form of direct project financing.
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want to select the most socially committed recipients. However, it also points out
that such strategy is not effective if the targets of aid/debt relief programs are
countries with governments of an "intermediate" type, where foreign intervention
may make "more of a difference."
From a methodological standpoint, we model the incompleteness of aid
contracts by assuming that only a subset of the recipient's actions is observable
and monitorable by donors. This allows us to analyze a situation where aid is
disbursed before the production and consumption of the social good occur. An
alternative approach is to assume, as in standard contract problems, that the donor
is able to observe the production of the social good, but only with an error.
1
8 Then,
the donor can impose ex post conditionality by linking debt relief to the observed
amount of the social good. Note that, in that context, if recipients are risk neutral,
the optimal solution involves making the recipients the residual claimants. If recip-
ients are risk averse, however, the optimal solution involves some risk sharing and
hence distortions. We chose our ex ante approach because it provided a simple
way of representing limits in the scope of conditionality and the associated distor-
tions in terms of mix of reforms often debated in the related policy literature. In
addition, the ex ante approach has the attractive feature of being consistent with
the notion that ex post punishments of "bad" recipient governments can be
severely limited by Samaritan-dilemma considerations (see Federico, 2001).
Finally, it is worth noting that although this paper discusses some of the prob-
lems associated with conditionality, it falls far short of addressing them all. In
particular, our framework cannot deal effectively with issues related to the debate
on the streamlining of conditionality. In our model, for the given information
structure, conditionality is always optimal in equilibrium. It follows that there is
no room for the notion of "excessive" conditionality defined as a level of condi-
tionality that, if reduced, would increase the production of the social good.
APPENDIX
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
I. Since for any k > k




1 - p(l - a)(G + A - k- e(k))
P-
1 < 0. (12)
\k>k
N
Suppose e(k) > k
NC. Since U'(k, 0) > 0, and U(.) is concave in e, a necessary condition for
e(k) > k is that:
|p| = pak(ke(k))
P-
1 - p(l - a)(G + A - k- e(k))
P-
1 > 0. (13)
18A model of this sort is provided by Azam and Laffont (2001).
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Because of the symmetry of the production function, however, at e(k) = k > k


















dk (p - 1)ak
Pe(k)
P-
2 + (1 - a)(p - l)(G + A - k - e(k))
p'
2
In addition, as e(k
NC) = k
NC, from (14) it follows that:
d(e(k)k)
dk
Hence, a necessary condition for the donor's first order conditions to be verified is that k > k
NC.
Finally, as for any A > 0, the IR constraint cannot be binding at k = k
NC, the existence of a
k e (k
NC, k
IR) such that ke(k) > k
NCe(k
NC), follows directly from a continuity argument.
Proof of Lemma 1
I. By totally differentiating the IR constraint, we have:













(A) First, since by Proposition 1, at equilibrium, e(k) < k, we know from equation (6) that the














so that the two terms in brackets in the numerator have the same sign. Now, from the first order






























NA, which means that the numerator
of (15) is negative. (A) and (B) in turn imply that -^- > 0.
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From (7), we have that lim e(k) = lim e
NC = k
NC = 0, so that using (10)
\imk
IR ={k:G+A-k = G}=A. Since, \ime(k) = G+A-k, and lim^
c = k
NC = %
a-»0 a-»l a-»l ^
lim k
lR = \k: k(G + A-k) = [%f 1 G + A + ^A(2G + A)
2







and the first order conditions are given by:
(I-CC)P-
1 -^(a^)p-





Since neither k = 0 nor /: = G can be a solution of the problem, and since the maximand
is continuous in k, an interior solution k should necessarily exist in which both equation (16)
and the second order condition are verified. Implicitly differentiating equation (16), after some
manipulation, we have that:
k> G + A dk
<0. 2 ' da





have discordant signs, and this is the case only if k e | ^. fi£ |.
When a—>1, the preference of the donor and those of the recipient converge and the
optimal (nonbinding level) of conditionality is k = ^-. Taking the limit of equation (16) for
a —>0, and solving the equation in £, it is immediate to verify that lim k = ^-.
Proof of Proposition 2
From Lemma 1, we know that 4_ < 0, -g- > 0, and that lim k
IR > lim k. Thus, for the IR to be
da da a_»i a_»i
binding for some recipient of type a e (0, 1), we need that lim k
IR < lim k <=> A < -£-. The rest
of the proof follows directly from Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
For & > a
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d is the minimum degree of social commitment for which the donor would find it optimal to
grant aid when the recipient's type is observable. Hence, if d > a




This means that at least the marginal government is rationed out under asymmetric information.
If instead d < a
c, we have k










so that no recipient that would have been granted relief under a observable is denied it.
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